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Abstract: This study investigates estimation errors due to hidden costs—the costs of 
implementation that are neglected in strategic decision-making processes—in the context of 
services offshoring. Based on data from the Offshoring Research Network, we find that 
decision makers are more likely to make cost-estimation errors given increasing configuration 
and task complexity in captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing, respectively. Moreover, 
we show that experience and a strong orientation towards organizational design in the 
offshoring strategy reduce the cost-estimation errors that follow from complexity. Our 
findings contribute to research on the effectiveness of sourcing and global strategies by 
stressing the importance of organizational design and experience in dealing with increasing 
complexity.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Many firms find that the implementation of strategic decisions can trigger substantial hidden 
costs that negatively affect firm performance. For example, a firm may find that the 
implementation of a diversification strategy requires substantially more coordination than 
initially expected. A firm may also discover that knowledge transfer in the context of 
internationalizing business activities is more costly than expected. By hidden costs, we refer 
to the unanticipated costs of implementation that arise in strategic decision-making processes 
(see Dibbern, Winkler, and Heinzl, 2008; Reitzig and Wagner, 2010; Stringfellow, 
Teagarden, and Nie, 2008). In this paper, we investigate the nature of estimation errors due to 
hidden costs. In particular, we seek to better understand why certain costs are hidden from 
managerial attention and thus not accounted for in initial cost estimations. 
We study hidden costs in the context of offshoring of administrative and technical 
services, i.e., the sourcing of business services supporting domestic and global operations 
from abroad in internal or external arrangements (Contractor et al., 2010; Manning, Massini, 
and Lewin, 2008). The offshoring of service activities has gained momentum in recent years. 
Today, many western firms not only offshore standardized IT and business processes, but also 
more complex, knowledge-intensive activities and product development (Lewin, Massini, and 
Peeters, 2009). However, many firms have begun to realize that managing an increasingly 
globally dispersed organization is more difficult and costly than initially expected (Dibbern et 
al., 2008; Stringfellow et al., 2008). In particular, decision makers often fail to accurately 
estimate the costs of offshoring and are therefore surprised by unexpected—or hidden—costs 
of implementing offshoring decisions.  
Most research on offshoring to date has focused on why firms offshore particular 
functions, the governance modes they choose, the locations they select to host offshored 
activities, and the outcomes that they achieve (e.g., Lewin et al., 2009; Kedia and Mukherjee, 
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2009; Mol, van Tulder, and Beije, 2005). In this paper, we focus on the organizational design 
of offshoring, and the challenge of coordinating and integrating offshoring activities in 
globally organized firms (Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). In this regard, offshoring can be 
described as an organizational reconfiguration in which originally co-located activities are 
relocated across distances in captive or outsourced arrangements, which must subsequently be 
re-integrated (Mudambi and Venzin, 2010). Consequently, firms are often presented with new 
complexities and uncertainties, which have an impact on decision makers’ abilities to estimate 
the costs of offshoring.  
Using comprehensive data from the Offshoring Research Network (ORN), we argue 
that the increased complexity that follows from offshoring involves a number of operational 
challenges and related costs, part of which are ignored or not anticipated when offshoring 
decisions are made. As a result, we observe a significant gap between expected and achieved 
performance, as measured by the distance between expected and achieved cost savings. 
However, we also argue that this relationship is moderated by the organizational design 
orientations of firms’ offshoring strategies and by firms’ offshoring experience. Firms with 
strategies characterized by a strong orientation towards an overall system of structures and 
processes, and firms with prior experience are more likely to anticipate and align offshoring 
complexity with corresponding organizational structures and processes. Thus, organizational 
design orientation and experience nurture decision makers’ abilities to anticipate the costs of 
complex organizations. 
Our findings contribute to the growing stream of literature on the operational 
challenges of offshoring (Srikanth and Puranam, 2011; Stringfellow et al., 2008) by 
emphasizing the importance of hidden costs, complexity, design strategies, and experience. 
On a more general level, these findings have important implications for estimation biases in 
strategic decision making, and improve our understanding of the role of experience and 
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organizational design orientation in relation to those biases (e.g., Durand, 2003; Hogarth and 
Makridakis, 1981; Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Makadok and Walker, 2000; March and 
Simon, 1958). This research emphasizes the organizational design of a firm and highlights 
how organizational changes should be incorporated into strategic analyses. This may 
stimulate future research on the evolution of global firm designs and architectures by stressing 
the role, magnitude, and consequences of complexity in organizations (e.g., Ethiraj and 
Levinthal, 2004; Nadler and Tushman, 1997; Sinha and Van de Ven, 2005). 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Hidden costs, complexity, and bounded rationality 
Hidden costs can be understood as implementation costs that are not anticipated in the various 
stages of strategic decision making. A key function in strategic decision making—defined as 
the commitment to important decisions in terms of actions to be taken, resources to be 
devoted, or precedents set (Dean and Sharfman, 1996; Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992; 
Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret, 1976)—is the ability to estimate the costs of 
implementing a strategic decision (Durand, 2003; Makadok and Walker, 2000). Often, 
however, firms find that unanticipated costs or ‘post-decision surprises’ (Harrison and March, 
1984) erupt and challenge the strategic intent and rationale of the decision. In such cases, 
these costs have been ignored or overlooked—thus hidden—by the decision maker in the 
strategic decision-making process. Hidden costs are thus ex ante unaccounted for, which is 
why they materialize ex post as a discrepancy between expected and realized costs. 
A direct consequence of hidden costs is a negative effect on a decision maker’s ability 
to estimate the impact of strategic decisions, as important costs are hidden from managerial 
attention. Previous research has emphasized that individual biases may impact decision 
makers’ estimation abilities (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Das and Teng, 1999), that 
routines may short-circuit individuals’ autonomous judgments (Nelson and Winter, 1982), 
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and that dominant logic may result in blind spots in decision making (Prahalad and Bettis, 
1986). In this paper, however, we focus on the role of the organizational context in decision 
makers’ estimation abilities (e.g., Durand, 2003; Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981; March and 
Simon, 1958) and, in particular, on how organizational complexity influences decision 
makers’ abilities to account for costs of implementation. Thus, we seek to understand the 
impact of complexity on the ability of firms to anticipate the actual costs of a strategic 
implementation. In this regard, we are able to explain how decision makers systematically 
ignore or overlook important costs in strategic decision-making processes. 
The organizational impacts and consequences of complexity have long been part of 
the research tradition (Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Loasby, 1976; Nickerson and Zenger, 
2002; Rawley, 2010; Simon, 1962; Williamson, 1975). Simon (1962: 468) defines complexity 
in systems as ‘a large number of parts that interact in a non-simple way.’ If organizations are 
viewed as networks of tasks (Grandori 2001; Thompson 1967), then complexity exists when a 
large number of tasks are interdependent. For example, an organization is complex if change 
in one unit requires change in many other units. Moreover, a growing number of 
interdependent parts in an organization increases combinatorial complexity, as the addition of 
one element results in an exponential increase in the number of possible interfaces and 
interdependencies (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004).  
A firm’s complexity can affect its decision making in many ways. For example, a firm 
that decides to disaggregate its organization into a number of smaller, semi-autonomous units 
will experience a rise in the total number of interfaces within the organizational system. As 
organizational tasks and activities require ongoing communication to coordinate decisions and 
behaviors, interdependencies arise along with a growing number of channels to coordinate 
joint and interdependent organizational actions (Thompson, 1967). This has consequences for 
information-processing demand (Simon, 1955), which, in turn, increases the likelihood of 
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decision errors (Levinthal, 1997). As such, increasing complexity progressively creates 
difficulties for decision makers attempting to grasp and anticipate the effects of emerging 
interdependencies on system behavior and performance (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Zhou, 
2011). Complexity limits the ability of managers to rationally account for all important 
decision factors (March and Simon, 1958), which increases the risk that certain performance-
detrimental consequences will remain hidden in the strategic decision-making process. 
Hidden costs, therefore, relate to implementation costs that are hidden from managerial 
attention at the point of strategic decision making (see Ocasio, 1997). 
The hidden costs of offshoring 
We investigate hidden costs in the context of services offshoring. Offshoring refers to the 
internal and external sourcing of tasks and services from a location outside the home country 
in support of domestic and global operations (Contractor et al., 2010; Manning et al., 2008). 
Many offshored activities are interlinked with domestic processes and often require complex 
coordination (Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). This setting is therefore suitable for investigating 
the interplay between complexity and hidden costs.  
A substantial body of research has demonstrated that offshoring decisions are driven 
by a number of factors, including expectations of lower labor and production costs (Dossani 
and Kenney, 2003), access to talent and qualified labor (Lewin et al., 2009), and opportunities 
to learn (Jensen, 2009). At the same time, however, there are also indications that the initial 
objectives of offshoring are not always achieved and that offshoring decisions may eventually 
prove more costly than expected (Dibbern et al., 2008; Massini et al., 2010; Stringfellow et 
al., 2008). For instance, the multinational IT corporation Dell Inc. decided to backsource its 
Indian service centers after encountering unexpected challenges of cultural and geographic 
distance (Frauenheim, 2003).  
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The concept of hidden costs can be related to three streams of offshoring research (see 
Table 1). The first stream focuses on the impact of hidden costs on the financial value of 
offshore outsourcing (e.g., Barthélemy, 2001; Overby, 2003)—a question of interest to 
business practitioners, in particular. In emphasizing the challenges of offshoring, these 
practitioner-oriented articles have attempted to specify and quantify the hidden financial costs 
of offshoring. 
 The second stream discusses hidden costs in relation to strategic choices between 
international outsourcing and vertical integration, where outsourcing—and the resulting loss 
of control and transaction costs resulting from the shift of ownership to an external partner—
might erode firms’ capabilities and resources (e.g., Bettis, Bradley, and Hamel, 1992; Hendry, 
1995; Reitzig and Wagner, 2010). For example, Stringfellow et al. (2008: 166) label 
‘invisible costs in offshoring services work’ as ‘hidden communication-related costs 
associated with the use of foreign service providers.’ Reitzig and Wagner (2010) argue that 
hidden outsourcing costs can disrupt incremental in-house learning processes. Dibbern et al. 
(2008) identify four particular types of unexpected ‘extra costs’ arising from outsourcing 
software projects to third-party providers abroad: 1) requirement specification and design 
costs, 2) knowledge-transfer costs, 3) coordination costs, and 4) control costs. 
 A third and more recent stream focuses more fundamentally on hidden costs 
associated with relocating and redesigning tasks and processes within an orchestrated value-
generating system; i.e., the costs of reconfiguring a firm’s internal and external value chains 
(e.g., Kumar et al., 2009; Levy, 1995; Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). According to this view, 
offshoring can be regarded as the process of reconfiguring value chain activities across 
dispersed locations regardless of whether outsourcing or an internal delivery model is chosen 
(Contractor et al., 2010; Manning et al., 2008). Therefore, hidden costs might arise from 
unanticipated organizational needs, and can be related to knowledge transfer, new 
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interdependencies, training and coaching, the protection of intellectual capital, or the 
monitoring of performance of offshore units. 
 In this study, we address all three research streams, but we focus in particular on the 
third stream by examining why certain costs of reconfiguring a firm’s value chain in the 
implementation of both captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing are hidden from 
managerial attention in decision-making processes and thus not accounted for in initial cost 
estimations. Obviously, the offshoring of services might also encapsulate hidden benefits, 
such as unanticipated advantages of relocating tasks and activities abroad. For instance, the 
well-known ‘went for price, stayed for quality’ reference (Dossani and Kenney, 2003) 
captures a situation in which firms encounter ‘positive externalities’ of offshoring. In other 
words, firms may find that certain outcomes, such as higher service quality, exceed initially 
expected benefits, such as lower labor costs. However, in this paper we focus on a setting in 
which the practice of offshoring typically undermines initial objectives.  
***INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
The complexity of offshoring 
We propose that cost-estimation errors as a manifestation of hidden costs can be explained by 
increasing offshoring complexity. In contrast to a company undertaking all of or the majority 
of its activities at home in proximity to its headquarters, a firm sourcing a large number of 
activities from multiple internal and external providers in different countries is likely to face 
higher complexity. In the following, we distinguish between two types of complexity in 
offshoring that challenge decision makers’ estimation abilities: configuration complexity and 
task complexity.  
Configuration complexity refers to complexity in terms of the interdependencies in the 
organizational configuration. In this regard, we distinguish between the structural, 
operational, and social layers of the organizational configuration, which together challenge 
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decision makers’ cost-estimation abilities. First, structural complexity arises because new 
interdependencies emerge between functional units and across country borders as a 
consequence of offshoring. For instance, when an organizational sub-task is relocated to a 
foreign location, its interdependencies with other organizational units are obscured by 
geographic, political, and institutional differences (Kumar et al., 2009). Similarly, prior 
research finds that extensive outsourcing of manufacturing creates new interdependencies, 
which increase the likelihood of delays and disruptions in global supply chains (e.g., Levy, 
1995). 
 Second, research suggests that the process of offshoring presents companies with a 
higher number of tasks and activities (Contractor et al., 2010; Mudambi and Venzin, 2010), 
thus increasing operational complexity. Driven by the potential to lower costs and increase 
efficiency by identifying specific tasks to be offshored, firms break down and ‘fine slice’ 
value chain activities into a larger number of sub-processes. For example, while research and 
development might constitute one distinct, integrated value chain activity in a home country 
context, firms might choose to disaggregate the function into a number of more narrowly 
defined tasks and activities when subjecting them to captive and outsourced offshoring. As a 
result, firms face a higher number of interdependencies among processes and, hence, 
increased operational complexity. 
 Third, we argue that the two types of complexity identified above relate to a third type, 
which we call social complexity. Recent research indicates that offshoring may not only 
provoke internal resistance (Lewin and Couto, 2007) but also hamper operational efficiency 
due to a lack of trust, status differences between onsite and offshore units, and a lack of 
understanding and communication in the process of delivering tasks and interacting with 
offshore units (Vlaar, van Fenema, and Tiwari, 2008; Levina and Vaast, 2008). A lack of 
face-to-face interaction, as well as cultural and language differences among employees at 
 10 
 
geographically dispersed locations, may increase social complexity given the need for ‘non-
simple’ practices of relationship-building between employees and teams. 
 Task complexity, in contrast, relates to the complexity of the individual offshoring 
implementations (e.g., Mudambi and Tallman, 2010; Kumar et al., 2009). A number of 
different task characteristics can influence the complexity of an offshoring implementation, 
including the task’s degree of standardized versus tacit knowledge flows; the presence of 
inexact and unknown means-ends connections; the number and interdependence of subtasks; 
and the existence of path-goal multiplicity (e.g., Campbell, 1988; Wood, 1986). In 
comparison with simpler tasks for which such aspects as input and output requirements are 
easily defined, complex tasks with imprecise and ambiguous requirements are more likely to 
subject the decision maker to bounded rationality and uncertainty in the decision-making 
process. Indeed, research suggests that firms are increasingly offshoring more complex tasks, 
such as design, engineering, and analytical services (Lewin et al., 2009). Accordingly, we 
argue that the task complexity of different offshoring implementations can challenge decision 
makers’ abilities to estimate the costs of relocating a service activity abroad. 
 In sum, we define offshoring complexity as a combination of configuration and task 
complexity. While task complexity resides within the actual implementation, configuration 
complexity occurs as a result of new interdependencies between countries, activities, and 
people. In line with research on complexity (e.g., Anderson, 1999; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 
2004; Rawley, 2010), we argue that a higher degree of offshoring complexity makes it 
difficult for decision makers to consider all important decision-making factors, especially the 
overarching organizational system and its effect on organizational behavior and performance, 
prior to an offshoring implementation. In particular, complexity has consequences for 
decision makers’ cost-estimation abilities, as the managerial task of understanding the 
globally reconfigured organization becomes complicated and is more likely to be misguided, 
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thus resulting in costs that are hidden from the decision makers’ view. Therefore, there is a 
greater risk that decision makers facing a high degree of offshoring complexity will make 
cost-estimation errors in the decision-making process. Accordingly: 
Hypothesis 1: A higher degree of offshoring complexity is likely to increase cost-
estimation errors. 
The moderating effect of organizational design orientation and experience 
A number of recent studies report that many firms experience improved performance as a 
result of offshoring, despite high complexity (e.g., Lewin et al., 2009; Massini et al., 2010). 
For instance, firms taking a more strategic approach to offshoring, such as those adopting 
consistent ways of selecting locations, implementing projects, and coordinating operations, 
report smaller discrepancies between expected and achieved cost savings (Massini et al., 
2010). Thus, we posit that the hypothesized relationship between offshoring complexity and 
cost-estimation errors is moderated by factors that explain why some firms are comparatively 
better than others in accounting for hidden costs of offshoring in the strategic decision-
making process. In the following, we argue that firms’ organizational design orientation and 
offshoring experience help decision makers to better estimate costs as offshoring complexity 
increases.  
 Hidden costs become more likely as the complexity of an organizational system 
increases. This makes it difficult for decision makers to direct appropriate attention during the 
decision-making process to future changes in organizational structures and the 
interdependencies that may result from offshoring. In this respect, the congruence between 
different components in an organizational system spread across different locations becomes 
central (Nadler and Tushman, 1997; Russo and Harrison, 2005). Organizational congruence is 
defined as ‘the degree to which the needs, demands, goals, objectives, and/or structures of one 
component are consistent with those of the others’ (Nadler and Tushman, 1997: 34). While 
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typical models of fit look at dyadic relationships, such as the fit between strategy and 
structure (Chandler, 1962), the congruence model is based on the assumption that fit can be 
multifaceted, simultaneously encapsulating different organizational dimensions. Accordingly, 
we use the congruence model to portray the fit between globally dispersed organizational 
processes, activities, and people, i.e., the degree to which structures and interdependencies 
across and within organizational boundaries remain consistent as offshoring complexity 
grows. High congruence corresponds to high consistency in the organizational system 
encapsulating the functional units and human resources spanning national borders and the 
interdependencies among them. Similarly, a low degree of congruence corresponds to low 
consistency in the organizational system.  
 The degree to which organizational congruence is reflected in a firm’s offshoring 
strategy is important for how accurately decision makers estimate the consequences of 
offshoring complexity. A dominant perception has been that a firm’s primary objective when 
offshoring is to reduce labor costs by targeting low-wage sourcing destinations, such as China 
and India, and to access qualified personnel and new markets (Dossani and Kenney, 2003; 
Kedia and Lahiri, 2007). However, research suggests that offshoring may also be motivated 
by the opportunity to improve a firm’s organizational system (Lewin and Couto, 2007). For 
example, a number of firms view the potential for increased organizational flexibility, 
business process reengineering, and reduced system redundancy as an important driver of 
offshoring. Moreover, firms with corporate-wide offshoring strategies report a range of 
offshoring outcomes besides reduced costs, such as organizational flexibility (Massini et al., 
2010).  
 We therefore argue that offshoring strategies involving a strong orientation towards 
the overall system of structures and processes, rather than the mere relocation of particular 
tasks for resource-seeking reasons, are better able to account for the hidden costs that follow 
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from increasing offshoring complexity, as managerial attention is directed towards how the 
organization and its interdependencies are affected by the offshoring decision (Ocasio, 1997). 
In such situations, decision makers can match the impact of the anticipated organizational 
changes caused by offshoring with resource allocations so that the main offshoring objectives 
can be met. Thus, a higher degree of orientation towards the organizational design of 
offshoring promotes the decision maker’s ability to align offshoring complexity with 
corresponding organizational structures and processes, and consequently negatively 
moderates the positive relationship between complexity and cost-estimation errors. Hence:  
Hypothesis 2: The positive association between offshoring complexity and cost-
estimation errors is negatively moderated by firms’ strategic orientation toward 
organizational design. 
A necessary prerequisite for recognizing the most efficient mechanisms for managing 
complex organizations is extensive organizational system knowledge. Organizational system 
knowledge can be defined as knowledge about individual organizational activities comprising 
an organizational system and about how those activities are integrated into an orchestrated 
organizational system (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Henderson and Clark, 1990). In order to 
make effective decisions based on expectations of how the organization is going to change, 
decision makers need knowledge about individual activities and about the ways in which 
different activities are integrated and linked together in a coherent organizational system. For 
example, Brusoni and Prencipe (2006) argue that knowledge evolution is a strong and 
important mediator in organizational change. Similarly, Haunschild and Sullivan (2002) 
suggest that complex and heterogeneous circumstances spur positive learning in 
organizations. Accordingly, firms’ abilities to estimate the consequences of the complexity of 
offshoring are affected by their organizational system knowledge, including knowledge of 
interdependencies and interfaces between different units and activities.  
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A central question is thus the following: How do firms acquire and accumulate 
knowledge to successfully integrate a vast array of heterogeneous activities into an 
orchestrated system? In this respect, offshoring is often portrayed as a learning-by-doing 
process (Jensen, 2009; Maskell et al., 2007). In particular, research shows that firms with 
previous offshoring experience generally display better performance in new offshoring 
ventures (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2007; Manning et al., 2008). Hutzschenreuter et al. (2007) 
argue that firms’ past offshoring experience may influence the range of issues and 
possibilities that managers consider when making offshoring decisions. Thus, we argue that 
firms with prior offshoring experience are more likely to have accumulated organizational 
system knowledge and will therefore be comparatively better in estimating the costs of 
offshoring associated with complexity. In other words, firms with experience are more likely 
to anticipate the hidden costs of offshoring and therefore avoid estimation errors. We 
therefore hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 3: The positive association between offshoring complexity and cost-
estimation errors is negatively moderated by the firms’ offshoring experience. 
In sum, we derive a theoretical model of hidden costs in which offshoring complexity 
is likely to increase cost-estimation errors but is negatively moderated by organizational 
design orientation and experience (see Figure 1).  
***INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
DATA AND METHODS  
We examine both the effect of offshoring complexity on cost-estimation errors as a 
manifestation of hidden costs, and the moderating effects of design orientation and offshoring 
experience of the firm using primary data collected by the Offshoring Research Network 
(ORN) and data gathered from secondary sources (on distances). The ORN is a network of 
scholars and organizations based in the US, Europe, and Australia studying the emergence of 
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trends in services offshoring (e.g., Lewin et al., 2009; Massini et al., 2010; Manning et al., 
2011). Since its foundation in 2004, the ORN research team has conducted two major surveys 
annually—a corporate client survey and a service provider survey—to collect offshoring-
related data. As both the client and provider surveys are taken online, respondents reach the 
survey website through external links or email invitations. Once registered and approved by 
the ORN survey team, respondents are added to the database. The fact that both surveys are 
utilized for this study, in combination with other secondary sources, helps us address the 
common method variance problem (Chang, van Witteloostuijn, and Eden, 2010).  
The corporate client survey collects data from US firms (since 2004) and European 
firms (since 2006) on their offshoring strategies, drivers, concerns, risks, outcomes, future 
plans, and concrete offshore implementations, including information on tasks offshored, 
launch years, location choices, delivery models (both captive and outsourced), and 
performance data. The data set used for this study includes data from 183 firms, of which 102 
are based in the US and 81 are European. These firms are active in different industries: 
manufacturing (32%), software (18%), finance and insurance (18%), and technical services 
(14%). 35 percent of the firms are large (>10,000 employees), 47 percent are medium size 
(500-10,000 employees), and 18 percent are small (<500 employees). These firms reported 
531 offshore implementations, defined as the allocation of particular tasks or processes to a 
location outside the home country. This implies that each firm has provided data for an 
average of 3.2 offshore implementations. Offshored tasks may include IT services, 
administrative services (e.g., HR, legal, finance, and accounting), call centers, software and 
product development, marketing and sales, and procurement. The three most common 
services offshored in our sample are IT services (22%), call centers (17%), and engineering 
services (10%). Offshoring implementations include captive offshoring projects (48%) as well 
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as offshore outsourcing projects (52%). The statistical analysis is conducted on the level of 
(these 531) offshore implementations.  
In addition, we use data from the ORN service provider survey. The service provider 
survey has collected information from business service providers at the firm and services 
level since 2007. Survey participants provide information on the services they provide; the 
locations from which they provide those services; perceived client expectations and 
operational risks; the performance of service delivery; and various features of the services 
provided. The latter include such items as the degree of commoditization and the complexity 
of tasks. The service provider database contains data (as of 2011) from 755 providers based in 
different countries and regions, including the US (32%), India (18%), China (4%), other 
Asian countries (8%), Western Europe (19%), Eastern Europe (7%), and Latin America (6%). 
The database contains data from all major large providers (19% of the sample had more than 
10,000 employees), including Infosys, Genpact, IBM Global Services, and Wipro. It also 
covers mid-size providers (37%; 500-10,000 employees) and small providers (44%; <500 
employees). Providers in the database offer various services, such as IT services (74% of 
providers), software development (65%), call centers (48%), finance and accounting (41%), 
human resource services (30%), engineering services (29%), marketing and sales (26%), 
procurement (25%), R&D (25%), design (19%), and legal (13%). Altogether, the database 
contains 3,399 service-specific entries, i.e., observations related to particular services that 
providers offer.  
For the analysis, we use a hierarchical regression analysis with successive linear 
regression (OLS) models, adding more explanatory variables to each model. OLS models are 
most suitable for this analysis, as we have a dependent variable with continuous values and as 
we propose a linear relationship between our dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables. The hierarchical feature refers to the gradual building of separate but related models 
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with an increasing number of explanatory variables until we reach the final model. We use 
three different versions of the final model in which all explanatory variables are included. 
First, we include all implementations in our sample (N = 531) to investigate the hypotheses. 
This model contains both captive and outsourced implementations. However, because there 
are transactional differences between captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing (see 
Williamson, 1985), we also split the sample into captive implementations (N = 253) and 
outsourced implementations (N = 278), and run the full model for both samples. 
Variable construction  
The variables, their sources, and their operationalization are presented in Table 2. Cost-
estimation error is measured as the difference between the cost savings expected from the 
offshoring project and the achieved cost savings. Most firms offshore with the objective of 
reducing costs (Manning et al., 2008). Thus, a strong empirical proxy of latent hidden costs is 
the deviation between expected and realized cost savings in offshoring. If expectations 
perfectly match the savings achieved through offshoring, then there has been no estimation 
error, but if expectations exceed achieved savings, then expectations have not been met and 
estimation error has occurred (costs are higher than expected). The few cases in which 
achieved savings are above expectations (‘hidden benefits’) are deleted from the sample, as 
this phenomenon might be explained by factors other than hidden costs. Both expected 
savings and achieved savings are measured as a share of total costs, so the value of cost-
estimation error can vary from 0 percent (when achieved savings are equal to expectations) to 
100 percent (when expected savings are very high but no savings are actually achieved).  
Offshoring complexity is measured along two dimensions: configuration complexity 
and task complexity. Configuration complexity is a composite measure consisting of three 
dimensions with the purpose of capturing structural, operational, and social complexity, 
respectively: global diversity of offshore operations (i.e., the number of countries in which a 
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firm is conducting offshoring), disaggregation of activities (the number of services for which 
a firm engages in offshoring), and spread of employees (the number of persons employed in 
offshore projects). After each of these dimensions is measured, they are then standardized and 
mean-centered around 0. The measure of configuration complexity is constructed as the 
product of these dimensions, which all have an equal weight in the composite measure. This 
measure is inspired by previous studies measuring organizational complexity as the degree of 
firms’ functional and occupational differentiation (e.g., Aiken, Bacharach, and French, 1980; 
Blau and McKinley, 1979; Damanpour, 1996). Task complexity is measured as the degree to 
which service providers view a particular task or process as complex. Data on this item is 
collected in the service provider survey by asking service providers to rank the complexity of 
different types of tasks on a five-point Likert scale (1 = not complex at all; 5 = very complex). 
The relatively low correlation of -0.06 (see Table 3) between configuration complexity and 
task complexity indicates that these are two distinct dimensions of offshoring complexity. 
Offshoring experience is a simple measure made for each implementation. It is 
measured as the time (in years) between the launch of the first offshoring project by the focal 
firm and the initiation of the focal implementation. The assumption is that the longer the 
respective firm has been engaged in offshoring projects, the more experience it has 
accumulated. There may be other ways to measure experience, perhaps by taking the number 
of services offshored or the number of locations offshored to into account. However, as we 
distinguish between experience and offshoring complexity, we focus on years of experience. 
Importantly, some firms offshore a variety of services to different locations in a short period 
of time, so that they have little saturated experience. Other firms might focus on offshoring 
particular functions over a longer period of time. The approach adopted here is akin to that 
used in other papers (e.g., Lewin et al., 2009). 
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Organizational design orientation is measured by asking respondents to indicate the 
extent to which ‘business process redesign’ is a driver for offshoring particular services on a 
five-point Likert scale (1 = not important at all; 5 = very important). The measure captures the 
extent to which offshoring projects that are related to particular services have been 
implemented in conjunction with optimizing the entire work process. In other words, we use 
this item as a proxy for the level of managerial attention (Ocasio, 1997) given to the 
orchestration of globally distributed processes. The correlation of -0.21 (p < 0.001) between 
the ‘business process redesign’ and ‘labor cost savings’ drivers indicates that the business 
process redesign driver is clearly distinct from the cost driver. The latter primarily captures 
managerial attention given to the cost benefits of offshoring particular processes without 
necessarily considering the impact of any one project on the entire workflow. Therefore, the 
attention respondents pay to business process redesign when offshoring is viewed as a good 
proxy for whether they consider the organizational design in the offshoring process. 
In addition, a number of control variables are included. First, we control for cost 
orientation (in contrast to organizational design orientation) by including an item on ‘labor 
cost savings’ as a driver of offshoring implementation. We also include a number of variables 
from the ORN Service Provider Survey in order to control for different factors at the service 
level. We control for three transaction-related effects for each offshored service: the 
frequency of interactions with the client (as a proxy for frequency), interdependence of 
client activities (as proxy for asset specificity), and frequency of disagreements with the 
client (as a proxy for uncertainty) (Williamson, 1985). These are ranked on a five-point Likert 
scale by the service providers for each service in which they are engaged. We also include 
commoditization of tasks, which refers to the process by which processes become less 
specific to firm or product characteristics, thereby lowering transaction and coordination costs 
for firms offshoring those processes (Davenport, 2005). Moreover, the use of collaborative 
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technologies in the service is added to control for the use of information and communication 
technology in the firm. The above-mentioned ORN Service Provider Survey control variables 
are measured using service-specific variables based on the perception of service providers, 
which are ranked using on five-point Likert scales. 
To capture other potential sources of hidden costs (e.g., Stringfellow et al., 2008), we 
add control variables for interaction distance. These are measured using secondary data on the 
distance between the home location and the foreign location of the offshore implementation. 
Interaction distance includes three dimensions: geographical distance, measured as air miles 
between the home location and the offshore location; cultural distance between two 
locations based on the Kogut and Singh index (Kogut and Singh, 1988); and language 
distance as a dummy variable indicating whether the same language is spoken both in the 
home and offshore locations.  
Controls are also included for the three most common services—IT services, call 
center services and engineering services—as the level of hidden costs might be affected by 
characteristics of particular services. As can be seen in the correlation matrix (Table 3), the 
nature of these services is rather distinct in terms of such factors as task complexity. For 
example, call center services are negatively correlated, engineering services are positively 
correlated and IT services are between these extremes. The services are added as dummy 
variables. 
Along similar lines, we include the number of employees in the home country to 
control for firm size. We also control for the type of delivery model by using a dummy for 
captive offshoring versus offshore outsourcing. Finally, we control for the time passed (in 
months) since the project was implemented. As it can be more difficult to retrospectively 
assess discrepancies between expected and realized costs the older a project is, this control 
variable captures biases related to the perceptions of the respondents.  
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***INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
The correlation matrix and descriptive data (mean values, standard deviation, and 
minimum and maximum values) are provided in Table 3. In order to detect potential problems 
of multicollinearity, we look at the correlation coefficients among the independent variables 
in the models. None of the correlations are above the usual threshold of 0.4 that indicates a 
possibility of multicollinearity. Hence, the data set does not seem to suffer from problems of 
multicollinearity. However, as the task complexity variable is relatively highly correlated with 
some of the control variables measured at the services level, we ran the models without these 
variables. All results were qualitatively the same.  
The mean value of our dependent variable—cost-estimation errors—is 6.68, indicating 
that, on average, firms achieved 6.7 percent less savings on their offshoring implementations 
than they expected. The standard deviation of 10.11 signifies that the observed firms vary in 
terms of their estimation accuracy, as actually achieved savings span from 25 percent to 100 
percent of expected savings. However, a closer look at the frequency of the cost-estimation 
error variable shows that 52 percent of the implementations (N = 278) show no cost-
estimation errors at all (savings meet expectations), while 48 percent reveal different levels of 
cost-estimation errors (higher costs than expected). In 27 percent of cases, achieved cost 
savings are lower than expected, but not by more than 10 percent, while in approximately 21 
percent of cases achieved savings are more than 10 percent lower than expected. These 
figures show that there is good variation in the dependent variable across the included firms 
and it also provides evidence that cost-estimation errors are a significant problem facing many 
offshoring firms.  
***INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE*** 
 Moreover, if we divide the sample into captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing, 
our results show that relatively high cost-estimation error is more common in cases of 
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offshore outsourcing than in cases of captive offshoring. The average levels of cost-estimation 
error are 7.92 for offshore outsourcing and 5.32 for captive offshoring (which is an significant 
difference in an ANOVA analysis, p < 0.01). Furthermore, 26 percent of all offshore 
outsourcing cases report that costs were more than 10 percent higher than expected, while this 
is true for only 16 percent of the captive offshoring cases. When expected and achieved 
savings are examined separately, we find that the difference in cost-estimation error is due to 
expected savings being significantly higher for offshore outsourcing, while the achieved 
savings are at the same level for captive and outsource offshoring. We explore this difference 
later in the paper.  
RESULTS 
The results of the hierarchical regression model are presented in Table 4. Model 1 includes 
the control variables and the two explanatory variables reflecting offshoring complexity: 
configuration complexity and task complexity. We add the two moderating variables—
organizational design orientation and offshoring experience—in Model 2. In Model 3, we add 
the interaction effect between the two complexity variables and our two moderating variables.  
***INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE*** 
In all three models, the two complexity variables are significant (p <0.05) and positive, which 
supports the hypothesis that offshoring complexity is an important determinant of cost-
estimation error as manifested in hidden costs of offshoring (H1). Model 1, which includes 
the two complexity variables, obtains an R2 value of 0.11. When the two moderating variables 
are added in Model 2, the R2 only increases to 0.12, which is due to the fact that none of the 
moderating variables are significant in this model. In Model 3, we go one step further and 
include the four interaction terms in order to test for the proposed moderating effects (H2 and 
H3). However, the model does not improve, as the R2 only increases to 0.13 with the use of 
four additional degrees of freedom. Moreover, only the interaction terms between task 
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complexity and organizational design orientation are negative and significant as expected (β = 
-1.78, p < 0.05). 
 Notably, some of the control variables are significantly related to cost-estimation 
error. Those factors increasing cost-estimation errors include cost orientation, task 
interdependence with client activities, cultural distance, language distance, and call center 
services, while commoditization and time passed since the initiation of the offshoring project 
lower cost-estimation errors. These results support complementary explanations for cost-
estimation error and hidden costs, as they highlight transactional factors, such as task 
interdependency with client operations and interaction distance like cultural and language 
distance (see Stringfellow et al., 2008). In addition, the outsourcing variable is significant in 
Model 1 (β = 1.78, p < 0.05), which reflects the higher level of cost-estimation error for 
offshore outsourcing as compared to captive offshoring.  
 In order to go beyond just adding the outsourcing variable as a control variable, the 
full model is applied to the two samples of captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing in 
Models 4 and 5, respectively. Interestingly, the R2 increases substantially in both cases, 
reaching 0.34 in the case of captive offshoring and 0.20 for offshore outsourcing. However, it 
is also obvious that the variables have different effects in the subsamples. In fact, no variable 
is significant in both subsamples. In the case of captive offshoring, configuration complexity 
significantly increases cost-estimation errors (β = 2.14, p < 0.001), while task complexity is 
insignificant. Both interaction terms—configuration complexity in terms of organizational 
design orientation and offshoring experience—are significant and negative (β = -0.29, p < 
0.01 and β = -0.06, p < 0.05, respectively), while neither organizational design orientation nor 
offshoring experience by themselves have significant effects. These results are in line with H2 
and H3, which propose that organizational design orientation and offshoring experience 
negatively moderate the positive relationship between complexity and hidden costs. Of the 
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control variables, the most notable are the significant positive distance variables (geographical 
and language distance), which indicate that cost-estimation errors increase as the distance 
between the home location and the offshore location increases. 
 In the case of offshore outsourcing implementations, task complexity is significant and 
positive (β = 23.09, p < 0.001), while configuration complexity is insignificant. The two 
interaction terms with task complexity are also significantly negative, although the interaction 
term between task complexity and offshoring experience is only moderately significant (β = -
0.45, p < 0.1). This provides further support for H2 and H3, indicating that organizational 
design orientation and experience mitigate cost-estimation errors in the case of offshore 
outsourcing as well. Of the control variables, it is evident that the more task-oriented variables 
(such as commoditization) and transaction-oriented variables (such as interaction with client 
and interdependency with client operations) are significant in predicting cost-estimation errors 
in outsourcing implementations.      
 In order to test the robustness of our findings, we conduct a number of alternative 
specifications of our models. These alternative specifications included Tobit models (as we 
have a skewed dependent variable), logistic models (a binary dependent model with or 
without hidden costs), and random coefficients models (controlling for firm effects). All of 
these models provide qualitatively similar, but weaker, results than the one reported here. In 
addition, we believe that from a theoretical point of view we have applied the most 
appropriate model in order to test the hypotheses, as our dependent variable is measured on a 
continuous scale, and as the question of whether hidden costs and cost-estimation error exist 
cannot be separated from the level of hidden costs. Both aspects are determined 
simultaneously in our preferred model.  
Furthermore, we have addressed the issue of endogeneity, i.e., whether the complexity 
variables are endogenously determined by the same factors as the estimation errors, because 
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those managers who underestimate costs might also offshore more and thereby increase the 
complexity. We did so by running simultaneous equation models with instrumental variables. 
For this purpose, we used a set of instruments that is correlated with the endogenous variable 
(complexity, in our case) but not correlated with the error from the regression in which the 
endogenous regressor appears (Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002). From a theoretical 
perspective, it seems likely that the ‘objective’ instruments in our model—geographical 
distance, home employment, and call center service, which are all correlated with the 
complexity variables (see Table 3)—would pass this test. In addition, from an empirical 
perspective there seems to be limited evidence of endogeneity problems, as all of the results 
remain qualitatively the same in the simultaneous equation models with instrument variables. 
Accordingly, the Hausman test favors the use of OLS models, which is also hinted at by the 
low correlations (0.09-0.11) between the complexity variables and cost-estimation errors (see 
Table 3). In addition, to test for over-identifying restrictions, we regressed the residual from 
the cost-estimation error equation on the instruments for the model (Sargan, 1958). The R2 
value in this regression is very low (0.0084) and none of the predictors are statistically 
significant. We also inspected the bivariate correlations between the instruments and the 
residuals, all of which were insignificant and close to 0. In combination, these tests do not 
provide absolute proof of the absence of endogeneity (see, e.g., Hahn, Ham, and Moon, 
2011), but they do suggest that the problem has been addressed in our model. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Firms and their managers often find that the initial objectives of strategic decisions are 
substantially undermined by hidden costs of implementation (e.g., Dibbern et al., 2008; 
Reitzig and Wagner, 2010; Stringfellow et al., 2008). In this paper, we have argued that 
hidden costs—implementation costs that are neglected in strategic decision making—occur in 
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situations of complexity in which decision makers are likely to be subject to bounded 
rationality. Faced with high complexity, decision makers are more likely to ignore the 
consequences of implementation and organizational change, and therefore fail to estimate the 
actual costs of a strategic decision. Hence, estimation errors are the manifestation of 
underlying and latent hidden costs.  
We have studied the phenomenon of such estimation errors in the context of the 
offshoring of administrative and technical services. Firms offshore service activities for a 
number of reasons: to reduce costs, to acquire strategic resources, and to gain market 
proximity (e.g., Lewin et al., 2009). Accordingly, we have argued that hidden costs occur in 
offshoring when the relocation of service activities abroad entails implementation costs that 
are initially ignored or unanticipated by decision makers.  
Based on comprehensive data from the Offshoring Research Network (ORN), we have 
developed a model of hidden costs that highlights the roles of offshoring complexity (task and 
configuration complexity), organizational design orientation, and experience in explaining 
why decision makers systematically fail to estimate the actual costs of services offshoring. In 
general, we find empirical support for our model: offshoring complexity increases cost-
estimation errors (H1), whereas design orientation (H2) and experience (H2) negatively 
moderate this relationship. However, while captive offshoring is much more responsive to 
broader configuration and design factors, hidden costs in offshore outsourcing are more 
driven by task- and transaction-related factors. 
Our findings correspond to recent research suggesting that firms with a strategic, 
rather than opportunistic, approach to offshoring decisions are not only likely to generate 
higher savings but are also more accurate in their savings expectations (e.g., Lewin and 
Couto, 2007; Massini et al., 2010). However, rather than looking at strategies in general, we 
focus on indicators of a firm’s orientation towards improving and orchestrating organizational 
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processes and structures through and alongside offshoring. Interestingly, a design orientation 
does not seem to reduce hidden costs per se; only when the complexity of offshore operations 
increases does a strong orientation towards orchestrating different structures and processes 
reduce hidden costs. This can be partly explained by the fact that as firms increase the scale 
and scope of offshoring, they may reach a tipping point where existing processes and 
structures conflict with the new setup of the globally dispersed operations (Massini et al., 
2010). At this point, only those firms actively seeking to reorganize their structures and 
processes in a coherent way may benefit from an increased scale and scope of offshoring. 
While this clearly hints at the transformational potential of offshoring, it also points to the 
need for firms to actively manage this potential, and to match the increasing relocation of 
processes with the adaptation of organizational structures and capabilities (Manning et al., 
2008).  
In addition, we find that cost-estimation errors due to hidden costs are significantly 
higher in offshore outsourcing implementations than in captive offshore implementations. Our 
results also indicate that in the case of captive (internal) offshoring, hidden costs increase with 
configuration complexity, whereas hidden costs result from increased task-level complexity in 
the case of offshore outsourcing. This highlights that task- and relationship-specific 
uncertainty, along with transaction costs, strongly affect overall operational costs in the case 
of outsourcing. In this regard, several studies show how certain design capabilities and 
mechanisms at the task level, such as contract design (Argyres and Mayer, 2007) and the 
alignment of client and vendor operations (Manning et al., 2011), can help firms better 
anticipate and manage operational costs outside their immediate control. Similarly, 
outsourcing typically involves tasks that are more standardized than those in captive 
offshoring (as indicated by the significant positive correlation of 0.14 between task 
commoditization and outsourcing in Table 3). In contrast, captive offshoring is more exposed 
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to configuration complexity issues, which increase the role of organizational design, as the 
decision maker has more discretion to make changes in the organization of internal activities. 
In comparison, task complexity in the case of captive operations does not significantly 
increase hidden costs, which indicates a greater internal capacity to manage (and plan for) 
complex tasks. Importantly, however, as offshoring complexity grows beyond certain tasks, 
hidden costs become an issue in captive operations, a finding that points to the roles of design 
and experience in safeguarding operations as offshoring increases in scale and scope. 
The present study has important implications for ongoing research on hidden costs of 
globally dispersed and complex operations. The concept of hidden costs in the offshoring 
literature is new and has so far only been used conceptually to underscore how the relocation 
of activities abroad might be more challenging than initially expected (e.g., Dibbern et al., 
2008; Stringfellow et al., 2008). We contribute to this research by uncovering drivers of 
estimation errors and the potential to foresee hidden costs when integrating globally dispersed 
and disaggregated operations into an orchestrated organization (Kumar et al., 2009; Srikanth 
and Puranam, 2011).  
On a more general level, this study helps us better understand estimation biases in 
strategic decision making, and the effects of experience and organizational design orientation 
on those biases (e.g., Durand, 2003; Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981; Kahneman and Lovallo, 
1993; Makadok and Walker, 2000; March and Simon, 1958). A firm’s estimation ability 
captures how accurately it can estimate and forecast the outcomes of organizational changes 
resulting from the implementation of a strategic decision (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). 
However, while the inhibiting role of complexity in decision-making processes is well 
established (Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Loasby, 1976; Nickerson and Zenger, 2002), we 
have shown that this relationship is negatively moderated by the organizational design 
orientation of the decision maker (Ocasio, 1997). As the implementation of a strategic 
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decision, such as the relocation of activities abroad, entails organizational changes, the 
decision maker must direct attention to how these changes might affect such aspects as the 
coordination of joint and interdependent organizational action (Thompson, 1967), information 
processing demand (Simon, 1955), and organizational response capacity (Anderson, 1999). 
Moreover, we have argued that the accumulation of organizational system knowledge 
(Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Henderson and Clark, 1990) is necessary for the decision maker 
to make effective strategic decisions in a context of complexity. Decision makers need 
experience and knowledge about the aspects of organizational design that deserve their 
attention. Thus, in viewing a firm’s estimation ability as a distinctive organizational 
competence (Durand, 2003; Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981; Makadok and Walker, 2000), this 
study implies that the fit between complexity and organizational design plays a key role in the 
implementation of strategies and should therefore be incorporated in strategic analyses. 
Our findings also add to research on appropriate organizational designs in complex 
environments (Ethiraj and Levintal, 2004; Nadler and Tushman, 1997) by stressing that the 
recent offshoring trend challenges the capacity of conventional organizational forms and 
structures to facilitate and safeguard globally dispersed operations (Srikanth and Puranam, 
2011). Future research should aim to better understand the effects of different design 
alternatives and mechanisms that firms utilize when the reach a certain level of complexity. A 
related issue is the extent to which design elements can be ‘firm specific’—reflecting more or 
less specific locations and processes across countries and locations.  
In addition, we emphasize the role of experience in strengthening the moderating 
effect of complexity on hidden costs. In this regard, we support research that underscores the 
central role of knowledge evolution in organizational change and design (Brusoni and 
Prencipe, 2006; Henderson and Clark, 1990). We can assume that different forms of 
experience and learning might contribute differently to organizational behavior and 
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performance (Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002; Madsen and Desai, 2010). Future research 
could therefore investigate which types of experience and learning contribute the most to the 
identification of organizational forms and structures in increasingly complex firms. 
Limitations and future research 
Our study has some limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, the concept 
of hidden costs is difficult to measure. We operationalized it as the respondents’ perceptions 
of the difference between the expected and realized savings of offshoring, using cross-
sectional observations. However, this operationalization might be skewed (Golden, 1992), 
especially as we ask for retrospective views about initial expectations. As a result, hidden 
costs might be underestimated in our study (although our results still hold despite the possible 
conservative bias of the dependent variable). A research design using observations collected 
before and after the offshoring implementation would have obvious advantages compared to 
the design used in this study. Also, as we primarily relied on survey data, we were unable to 
analyze the actual decision-making process and we did not look at specific implementation 
processes in detail. Future studies can use qualitative research designs to better address the 
various factors contributing to the ignorance of implementation costs in decision-making 
processes under conditions of complexity. 
We have also limited the theoretical explanation of our dependent variable to the role 
of the organizational context in the decision maker’s estimation ability, thus leaving out an 
important discussion on intentionality (Hutzschenreuter et al. 2007; Salas, Rosen, and 
DiazGranados, 2010). For instance, situations of complexity may entail increased uncertainty, 
which invites political processes in decision making. In such situations, stakeholders may 
seek influence by emphasizing arguments that serve their own interests while downplaying 
others (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). Decision makers may also follow institutional 
norms, bureaucratic procedures, and prior strategic commitments to reduce uncertainty and 
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ambiguity (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), thereby allowing for solutions that might be 
inefficient. Thus, while we assume that the organizational environment has a significant 
influence on decision-making processes in which some cost factors are unintentionally 
ignored, other cost factors may be intentionally downplayed in order to promote particular 
decisions. In this sense, a strong orientation towards organizational design could be a way to 
address politics within the organization. Future research could therefore investigate the 
ramifications of intentional underestimations of costs in complex organizations. For instance, 
is there evidence that decision makers intentionally underestimate the costs of implementing 
strategic decisions? How might variables such as complexity, organizational design 
orientation, and experience affect decision makers in terms of intentionally underestimating 
future costs? 
Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, by explaining deviations between strategic objectives and actual performance 
through the concept of hidden costs, an important field of research is unlocked that can more 
accurately clarify unintended consequences of firms’ strategic behavior. While we found that 
complexity, along with experience and orientation toward organizational design, explained 
much of this deviation, a number of other contingencies should be examined in future 
research. In this regard, our study suggests that drivers of hidden costs within the boundary of 
the firm may differ from hidden costs in the context of inter-organizational arrangements. 
This difference deserves further exploration. Finally, our study highlights services offshoring 
as an increasingly important empirical field for investigating strategic decision making, 
complexity, and design in contemporary organizations. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical model: the hidden costs of offshoring 
 
 
Table 1. Three streams of research on the hidden costs of offshoring 
 
Theoretical 
focus 
 
Research question 
 
Examples/consequences of 
hidden costs 
 
 
Indicative literature 
 
Performance 
indicator 
 
How might the practice of 
offshoring eventually 
undermine anticipated 
financial value? 
 
 
• Costs of selecting a 
vendor 
• Costs of layoffs 
• Cultural costs 
• Ramp-up costs 
• Costs of managing an 
offshore contract 
 
 
• Barthélemy (2001) 
• Overby (2003) 
 
Non-contractual 
costs 
 
How does international 
outsourcing (in contrast to 
vertical integration) create 
unexpected costs for firms? 
 
 
• Reduce learning 
capabilities 
• Reduce robustness 
• Reduce long-term 
responsiveness 
• Reduce coordination 
ability 
• Undermine core 
competences 
 
 
• Bettis et al. (1992) 
• Hendry (1995) 
• Reitzig and Wagner 
(2010) 
 
 
Costs of 
reconfiguration 
and relocation 
 
 
How does the global 
relocation and 
reconfiguration of business 
tasks and activities create 
unexpected costs for firms? 
 
• Coordination costs 
• Design/specification 
costs 
• Control costs 
• Knowledge transfer 
costs 
 
 
• Dibbern et al. (2008) 
• Kumar et al. (2009) 
• Stringfellow et al. 
(2008) 
• Srikanth and Puranam 
(2011) 
 
 
Organizational 
design orientation 
H1 + 
H3 - 
 
 
Offshoring 
complexity 
Cost-
estimation 
errors 
Offshoring 
experience 
H2 - 
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Table 2. Operationalization of variables in the models 
Variable Operationalization Data Source 
Cost-estimation 
error 
Percentage of savings expected minus the percentage of savings achieved when 
offshoring 
ORN Client 
survey 
Configuration 
complexity 
The product of the number of services, number of countries, and number of 
employees (in thousands) that are offshored  
ORN Client 
survey 
Task complexity  The average scores at the service level of the provider’s assessment of “the 
complexity of tasks” (on a five-point scale). 
ORN Provider 
survey 
Offshoring 
experience 
Years from the launch of the firm’s first offshoring project to the focal 
implementation 
ORN Client 
survey 
Organizational 
design orientation 
Based on the question: Please indicate the importance of enhancing efficiency 
through business process redesign as a strategic driver for the offshore 
implementations (1 = not important at all; 5 = very important) 
ORN Client 
survey 
Cost orientation Based on the question: Please indicate the importance of labor cost savings as a 
strategic driver for the offshore implementations (1 = not important at all; 5 = very 
important) 
ORN Client 
survey 
Interaction with 
client  
The average scores at the service level of the provider’s assessment of “the 
frequency of client interaction” (on a five-point scale). 
ORN Provider 
survey 
Interdependency of 
client 
The average scores at the service level of the provider’s assessment of “the 
interdependency with processes in client organization” (on a five-point scale). 
ORN Provider 
survey 
Disagreement with 
client 
The average scores at the service level of the provider’s assessment of “the 
frequency of disagreement with client in performing tasks” (on a five-point scale). 
ORN Provider 
survey 
Commoditization The average scores at the service level of the provider’s assessment of “the extent 
of commoditization today” (on a five-point scale). 
ORN Provider 
survey 
Use of collaborative 
technologies 
The average scores at the service level of the provider’s assessment of “the 
collaborative technologies used in performing tasks” (on a five-point scale). 
ORN Provider 
survey 
Geographical 
distance 
The distance in air miles (in thousands km) between the home location and the 
offshore location 
Google distance 
calculator 
Cultural distance The Kogut-Singh index of distance between the home location and the offshore 
location 
Hofstede’s 
measures 
Language distance A dummy indicating whether the main language spoken in the home location is the 
same as the language spoken in the offshore location (1 = different) 
MLA language 
map 
Home employment Number of employees in home country in thousands ORN Client 
survey 
IT service A dummy indicating whether the implementation is an IT service (1 = IT service) ORN Client 
survey 
Call center service A dummy indicating whether the implementation is a call center service (1 = call 
center service) 
ORN Client 
survey 
Engineering service  A dummy indicating whether the implementation is an engineering service (1 = 
engineering service) 
ORN Client 
survey 
Outsourcing  A dummy indicating whether the offshore implementation is captive offshoring (= 
0) or offshore outsourcing (= 1) 
ORN Client 
survey 
Time Months since the respective offshoring project was implemented ORN Client 
survey 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix (N = 531)* 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1) Cost-estimation error 1.00                    
2) Configuration complexity 0.11 1.00                   
3) Task complexity 0.09 -0.06 1.00                  
4) Offshoring experience -0.09 -0.06 -0.14 1.00                 
5) Org. design orientation 0.02 0.07 -0.07 0.20 1.00                
6) Cost orientation 0.09 0.06 0.04 -0.31 -0.21 1.00               
7) Interaction with client  0.08 -0.06 0.31 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 1.00              
8) Interdependency of client 0.04 -0.05 0.21 -0.02 -0.01 0.09 0.31 1.00             
9) Disagreement with client 0.05 0.08 0.10 -0.12 0.03 0.09 -0.15 0.05 1.00            
10) Commoditization -0.07 0.13 -0.32 -0.09 -0.05 0.11 -0.24 -0.33 -0.25 1.00           
11) Collaborative technology  -0.07 0.05 -0.23 0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.19 0.01 0.30 1.00          
12) Geographical distance 0.04 0.11 0.08 -0.30 -0.08 0.26 -0.02 0.08 0.13 -0.01 0.01 1.00         
13) Cultural distance -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.11 0.03 0.03 -0.12 0.11 0.18 1.00        
14) Language distance 0.01 -0.11 0.06 0.27 0.01 -0.25 0.20 0.01 -0.12 -0.17 0.04 -0.23 0.29 1.00       
15) Home employment -0.03 0.23 -0.15 -0.12 -0.04 0.15 -0.16 -0.05 0.01 0.15 0.04 0.13 -0.03 -0.12 1.00      
16) IT service 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.15 -0.03 0.14 -0.31 -0.27 0.28 0.33 -0.21 0.07 -0.04 -0.12 0.10 1.00     
17) Call center service -0.05 0.14 -0.35 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.27 -0.18 -0.29 0.38 0.36 -0.10 -0.07 -0.02 0.12 -0.23 1.00    
18) Engineering service -0.06 -0.02 0.31 0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.11 0.35 -0.24 -0.27 -0.32 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.18 -0.15 1.00   
19) Outsourcing 0.13 0.05 0.03 -0.19 -0.07 0.18 -0.03 -0.11 0.01 0.14 0.06 0.09 -0.01 -0.16 0.01 0.14 0.07 -0.07 1.00  
20) Time -0.14 -0.01 0.06 0.12 0.01 -0.04 0.16 0.04 -0.10 -0.14 -0.06 -0.18 -0.12 0.15 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.14 1.00 
 
Mean 
Std. dev. 
Min. values 
Max. values 
 
6.68 
10.11 
0 
75 
 
0.04 
1.01 
-1.16 
8.20 
 
3.55 
0.46 
2.88 
4.47 
 
4.46 
8.28 
0 
41 
 
3.32 
1.27 
1 
5 
 
4.24 
1.02 
1 
5 
 
3.89 
0.25 
3.57 
4.36 
 
3.63 
0.15 
3.42 
4.00 
 
2.45 
0.24 
2.00 
2.83 
 
3.19 
0.42 
2.38 
3.87 
 
3.36 
0.14 
2.97 
3.75 
 
8.52 
4.19 
0 
16.24 
 
8.89 
5.49 
2 
31.48 
 
0.56 
0.50 
0 
1 
 
21.8 
41.1 
1 
385 
 
0.22 
0.41 
0 
1 
 
0.17 
0.37 
0 
1 
 
0.10 
0.30 
0 
1 
 
0.52 
0.50 
0 
1 
 
7.40 
4.00 
2 
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*All values greater than 0.09 are significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 4. Hierarchical regression models (N = 531) – t-values in parenthesis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Cost-estimation error in decision making 
 All implementations Captive 
offshoring 
Offshore 
outsourcing 
Configuration complexity 0.19** 
(0.06) 
0.19** 
(0.06) 
0.40* 
(0.19) 
2.14*** 
(0.47) 
0.10 
(0.63) 
Task complexity 6.71* 
(2.73) 
6.41* 
(1.86) 
12.59** 
(3.86) 
7.46 
(5.02) 
23.09*** 
(5.53) 
Organizational design orientation  -0.13 
(0.35) 
-0.67* 
(0.28) 
-1.64 
(1.85) 
-1.09* 
(0.41) 
Offshoring experience  -0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.48 
(0.46) 
-0.12 
(0.08) 
-0.14 
(0.09) 
Configuration complexity* 
Organizational design orientation 
  -0.04 
(0.09) 
-0.29** 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.17) 
Configuration complexity* 
Offshoring experience 
  -0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.06* 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
Task complexity*Organizational 
design orientation 
  -1.78* 
(0.78) 
0.60 
(1.04) 
-2.80* 
(1.11) 
Task complexity*Offshoring 
experience 
  0.13 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.45† 
(0.26) 
Costs orientation 1.07* 
(0.47) 
0.98* 
(0.49) 
1.04* 
(0.50) 
-0.46 
 (0.55) 
2.25* 
(0.87) 
Commoditization -15.21*** 
(4.25) 
-15.01*** 
(4.29) 
-15.65*** 
(4.28) 
-4.37 
(5.46) 
-23.99*** 
(6.12) 
Use of collaborative technologies -1.77 
(4.77) 
-1.85 
(4.78) 
-1.61 
(4.79) 
-3.22 
(6.71) 
7.14 
(6.79) 
Interaction with client 9.31 
(5.98) 
8.88 
(6.03) 
9.13 
(6.03) 
2.03 
(7.55) 
19.83* 
(8.99) 
Interdependency of client 12.94** 
(4.62) 
12.91** 
(4.64) 
13.31** 
(4.63) 
2.60 
(5.73) 
25.16** 
(7.61) 
Disagreement with client 7.49 
(4.61) 
7.41 
(4.61) 
8.46 
(4.67) 
0.19 
(6.04) 
6.38                   
(7.91) 
Geographical distance 0.21 
(0.14) 
0.20 
(0.14) 
0.21 
(0.14) 
0.39* 
(0.17) 
0.07 
(0.21) 
Cultural distance 0.23* 
(0.10) 
0.23* 
(0.10) 
0.24* 
(0.10) 
0.15 
(0.11) 
0.36* 
(0.16) 
Language distance 2.83* 
(1.28) 
2.93 
(1.29)* 
2.91* 
(1.28) 
3.89* 
(1.59) 
1.35 
(1.86) 
Call center service 16.45** 
(5.08) 
16.20** 
(5.11) 
18.02*** 
(5.19) 
0.95 
(6.81) 
25.22** 
(8.10) 
IT service 2.49 
(1.72) 
2.45 
(1.72) 
2.73 
(1.73) 
3.78† 
(2.11) 
2.42 
(2.88) 
Engineering service -2.68 
(2.01) 
-2.51 
(2.03) 
-2.42 
(2.03) 
-1.88 
(2.36) 
-2.59 
(3.31) 
Home employment -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Time -0.39*** 
(0.11) 
-0.38*** 
(0.11) 
-0.38** 
(0.11) 
-0.37** 
(0.13) 
-0.29 
(0.19) 
Outsourcing 
 
1.78* 
(0.90) 
1.75† 
(0.90) 
1.47 
(0.90) 
  
Intercept 55.20*** 
(14.43) 
45.01** 
(18.00) 
35.32* 
(19.14) 
27.42 
(16.67) 
83.97† 
(44.62) 
N 
F-value 
R-square 
531 
4.07*** 
0.11 
531 
3.66*** 
0.12 
531 
3.38*** 
0.13 
253 
5.42*** 
0.34 
278 
2.86*** 
0.20 
†, *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively. 
The significant hypothesized relationships are in bold. 
